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1. Introduction
The following contains an evaluation of Book VII (Unjustified enrichment) of the
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR).1 It was written as part of the evaluation
carried out by the Common Core of European Private Law group in the context of the
Joint Network on European Private Law (CoPECL). The explicit aim of this evaluation
is to put the black letter rules of the DCFR to the test by applying them to a set of three
hypothetical cases. This case law-assessment should focus on the ‘applicability and
practicability’ of the draft-rules proposed by the Study Group on a European Civil Code
and laid down in the DCFR.
In the following, the uniform structure used for the work of the Common Core
group is followed.2 This structure consists of two parts. In part A, the three cases will be
analysed by applying the DCFR at the level of the so-called operative formants (I),
descriptive formants (II) and (where possible) meta-legal formants (III).3 When it
comes to the descriptive formants, we should be aware of the fact that it is difficult
to give an overview of conflicting opinions as one can in national law: the rules of the
DCFR were of course not yet put into effect, nor has there until now been much dis-
cussion of their substance. Part B contains a critical evaluation of the rules of the
DCFR and some further observations on their use. As the observations in part B are
applicable to the whole set of rules of Book VII, one can find part B after the discussion
of the cases.
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1 Ch. von Bar, E. Clive and H. Schulte-Nölke (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of
European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference, Interim Outline Edition (Munich,
Sellier, 2008). The text is also available at http://www.law-net.eu.
2 See for this method e.g. M. Bussani & U. Mattei (eds),Making European Law: Essays on the
Common Core Project (Trento, Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche, 2000).
3 See for this distinction R. Sacco, Legal formants: a Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law
(1991) 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 1.
Unjustified Enrichment 2. Three Cases
Before discussing the three cases, two general remarks have to be made. First, it is
important to note that the present authors did not have at their disposal the (draft)
comments and illustrations to the provisions of Book VII. What is more, and unlike it
is the case with most other parts of the DCFR, the Study Group on a European Civil
Code’s volume on unjustified enrichment was not yet published at the time this eva-
luation was written.4 This makes it difficult to adequately assess the relevant draft-
rules.5 Secondly, we like to emphasise that our evaluation is restricted to three cases
only. These cases deal with problems that, in our view, are representative for unjusti-
fied enrichment law. Each case focuses on the question whether a claim should exist or
not; we do not deal with the technical rules on e.g. reversal of enrichment (Chapter 5)
and on defences (Chapter 6). As will be shown in section B of this contribution, we
believe there is a good reason for this restriction.
2. Three Cases
Case 1
Building on another’s land
Building contractor City Construction BV contracts with Lars for the building of several shops and
houses on a site. Lars is unable to pay the bills. It then turns out that the land on which the shops were
built is owned by Lars’ brother, Sven. According to rules of property law, Sven has now become owner of
the buildings constructed on his land, without having paid for them. Is City Construction entitled to
recover damages from Sven on the basis of unjustified enrichment?
I. Operative Rules
Unjustified enrichment law is an area for which it remains hard to find a ‘common
core’ of European private law. The differences in approach found in the major legal
systems in Europe (such as England, Germany and France) are great and can, in many
instances, be traced back to one fundamental question: on what legal basis may a claim
for unjustified enrichment be grounded?
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4 The DCFR almost literally follow the Principles of European Unjustified Enrichment Law as
drafted by the Study Group on a European Civil Code (revised version of 27 February 2006)
and published at http://www.sgecc.net. Publication of these principles, together with com-
ments, in the series on Principles of European Law (Sellier, Munich) is announced for March
2010: Stephen Swann and Christian von Bar (eds), Unjustified Enrichment.
5 There are two sources that elaborate on the choices made in the DCFR: S. Swann, The
Structure of Liability for Unjustified Enrichment: First Proposals of the Study Group on a Euro-
pean Civil Code, in R. Zimmermann (ed.) Grundstrukturen eines Europäischen Bereicher-
ungsrecht (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 265 ff. and E. Clive, Unjustified Enrichment, in
A.S. Hartkamp et al (eds), Towards a European Civil Code, 3rd edn (Nijmegen, Ars Aequi,
2004) 585 ff.
DCFR, Book VII Case-Based Assessments
It may be useful to note at this place that the solution proposed by the drafters of
the DCFR does appear to build on a common core extracted from comparative re-
search of national solutions. The underlying legal principles on which the systems
base their specific rules are in fact quite similar and may provide a basis for formulating
an acceptable model rule (see further under II). The basic rule, laid down in Art.
VII. – 1:101(1) of the DCFR, therefore, states quite generally:
‘A person who obtains an unjustified enrichment which is attributable to another’s
disadvantage is obliged to that other to reverse the enrichment.’
The main elements, therefore, are (i) that there has been an enrichment, which can be
(ii) attributed to (iii) another’s disadvantage, and (iv) that qualifies as unjust. This rule
is fleshed out in the following provisions of Book VII, however also with a certain
degree of abstraction remaining in the wording of the provisions. An explanation
for that approach may be that the drafters have sought to find a compromise between
the national law approaches, or even elaborate on them in order to find some sort of
‘best solution’, without being tied to any of the taxonomies particular to specific na-
tional laws.6 This way, emphasis is put on what the systems have in common, regard-
less of the fact that great differences remain in the manner in which the general prin-
ciple finds expression in national systems.
The sensibility of this approach may be questioned in light of the still very promi-
nent differences between national rules on unjustified enrichment. As will be seen,
the hypothetical claim by City Construction may be successful in one jurisdiction but
not in others. We will now first discuss these national approaches before turning to the
question how the DCFR would solve this hypothetical case.
A general classification of the way in which national legal systems in Europe deal
with questions of unjustified enrichment distinguishes three different categories, or
taxonomies.7 A number of civil law jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, France,
Italy and Spain, draw a distinction between undue payment (condictio indebiti) on the
one hand, and unjustified enrichment on the other. Germany and England, by con-
trast, do not recognise a general action of unjustified enrichment but instead recognise
several types or categories of unjustified enrichment claims. The underlying basis of
these categories, however, differs. Where German law fits in with other civil law sys-
tems in which the ground for the claim is sought in the absence of a legal basis (sine
causa), English law focuses on a positive reason to reimburse for unjustified enrich-
ment and has centred its approach around ‘unjust factors’ such as mistake, duress, fail-
ure of consideration and illegality.
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6 Cf. J.M. Smits, A European Law on Unjustified Enrichment? A Critical View of the Law of
Restitution in the Draft Common Frame of Reference, (2008) 19 Stellenbosch Law Review
179, 184.
7 Smits, o.c., (2008) Stell LR, 182. See also R. Zimmermann, Bereicherungsrecht in Europa:
Eine Einführung, in R. Zimmermann (ed), Grundstrukturen, o.c., 23 ff.; D. Johnston and R.
Zimmermann (eds.), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Unjustified Enrichment 2. Three Cases
The hypothetical case of the brothers Lars and Sven finds its origin in Dutch law,
where the actual case led to a landmark decision of the Dutch Supreme Court, the
Hoge Raad, in 1959.8 At that point in time, the Dutch Civil Code (or Burgerlijk Wet-
boek) did not contain a general provision on which a claim for unjustified enrichment
could be based. The judgment of the Hoge Raad proclaimed that a cause of action not
based on a specific provision of the Code, such as here a right to the reversal of an
unjustified enrichment, would nevertheless be recognised if it was in accordance with
the system of the Code and with provisions that did give ground to a legal entitlement
of a similar kind.9 On the facts of the case, this meant nevertheless that the claim was
unsuccessful. Under rules of Dutch property law, a landowner could not be required to
return, by the payment of a sum of money, the enrichment which he had enjoyed as a
result of the possessor or the lessee of the land having effected attachments to it.10 As
the possessor or lessee did not have an action for unjustified enrichment, the Hoge
Raad was persuaded that the claimant Quint, a contractor with the lessee, by analogy
should also be denied his claim. The only exception, namely where the possessor had
acted in good faith and was thus accorded the protection accorded to the bona fide
possessor under the Code, did not apply.11 After all, Quint had the opportunity to
check the public registry in order to ascertain that the land on which he was building
in fact belonged to his contracting party, Hubertus te Poel.
If the case of City Construction and Sven were to come before a Dutch court under
the current Civil Code, the outcome of the case is likely to be different, though it still
depends on whether it fits in with the general system of the Code. The action for
unjustified enrichment now has a legal basis in Art. 6:212 – introduced in the new
Dutch Civil Code in 1992 – which provides that ‘a person who has been unjustifiably
enriched at the expense of another is obliged, so far as reasonable, to make good the
other’s loss, up to the amount of his enrichment.’12 Though at this general, abstract
level, the rule is the same as that of the DCFR, the application of the rule is still
dependent on particular provisions of national law.13 Arts. 3:121(2) and 7:216(3) of
the new Dutch Civil Code explicitly allow the possibility of an action for unjustified
enrichment to the possessor or lessee, without the previous requirement of good faith.
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8 Quint v. Te Poel, Hoge Raad 30 January 1959, NJ 1959, 548.
9 Quint v. Te Poel.
10 Artt. 658 and 1603 of the former Burgerlijk Wetboek, in force until 1992.
11 Art. 659 of the former BW.
12 Translation taken from E.J.H. Schrage, Unjustified Enrichment; Recent Dutch developments
from a comparative and historical perspective (1999) XLVI Netherlands International Law
Review 57, reproduced in J. Beatson and E.J.H. Schrage (eds), Cases, Materials and Texts
on Unjustified Enrichment (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 58. Whether official recogni-
tion of a general action for unjustified enrichment came with the entry into force of this
provision in the new Code, or whether the timeline starts withQuint v. Te Poel is a matter of
debate; compare J.W.M.K. Meijer, Ongerechtvaardigde verrijking. Een systematische analyse
van het begrip ongerechtvaardigdheid, toegepast op kostenverhaal bij bodemsanering (Den Haag,
SDU, 2007) 13. See also E.J.H. Schrage, Ongerechtvaardigde verrijking en restitution (1993)
WPNR 6118.
13 See further below.
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Assuming that – in accordance with Quint/Te Poel – this approach can be applied by
analogy to the building contractor, it is likely that City Construction’s claim would
now be successful. Crucial to this different outcome, it should be stressed, is that the
good faith requirement in the relevant provisions of property law has been dropped.
As far as German law is concerned, a different route is followed. Though § 812BGB
may suggest differently, a unified law of unjustified enrichment never developed in Ger-
man law.14 Instead, several distinct legal bases exist on which a claim may be brought,
found at different places in the second and third book of the German Civil Code, the
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). The two main categories are Leistungskondiktion (where
the enrichment is based on performance or transfer without a legal basis) andEingriffs-
kondiktion (the defendant encroaches on the property of the other party).15
The hypothetical claim of City Construction does not fall into either of these main
categories, but finds a solution in one of two other types of restitutionary claims recog-
nised under German law. On the facts of the case, it is arguable that the defendant’s
property was improved at the expense of City Construction. A possibility for reimburse-
ment for this type of enrichment exists under specific provisions of the BGB. For ex-
ample, §§ 951, 946 and 994 BGB, which apply to developments on another’s land,16
grant to the possessor a claim against the owner for reimbursement of expenditure in-
curred. Since the provisions, however, only see onnecessary expenses, they are unlikely
to give legal back-up to City Construction’s claim. The outcome of the case, therefore,
will be different from Dutch law. The other restitutionary claim recognised in German
law, but not applicable here, is where the claimant paid another person’s debt.17
The divergence between national approaches becomes even more clearly apparent
in the comparison with English law. Here, as in German law, no general action for
unjustified enrichment is recognised. Instead the focus is on the position of the defen-
dant and an action for unjustified enrichment lies in cases where a claim can be
brought under one of the ‘unjust factors’ recognised by the courts.18 The unjustness
in the current hypothetical can be found in a so-called total failure of consideration on
the part of Sven. In exchange for the building works carried out by City Construction,
Sven has not provided any counter-performance or transfer, him being merely a third
party to the contract between his brother and City Construction.19 Under this model,
therefore, the claim would be likely to succeed.
Jan Smits / Vanessa Mak 253
14 Compare Beatson and Schrage, o.c., 42; B.S. Markesinis, H. Unberath and A. Johnston,
The German Law of Contract, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 27 ff., 33.
15 Beatson and Schrage, o.c., 42.
16 Ibid., 50.
17 § 812 (1) BGB.
18 That this is still the predominant opinion was most recently confirmed in Deutsche Morgan
Grenfell Group Plc v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] UKHL 49; [2007] 1 AC 558. See
generally on unjustified enrichment in English law: Goff and Jones on Restitution (London,
Sweet & Maxwell, 2007); G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford, OUP,
2006); P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd edn (Oxford, OUP, 2005).
19 Total failure of consideration is not limited to the contractual context and a more accurate
description may therefore be ‘failure of the basis of the transfer’; compare Beatson and
Schrage, o.c., 296 ff. It is, however, still a limited category and it should not be confused
Unjustified Enrichment 2. Three Cases
Turning to the DCFR, it can be seen that the solution adopted there seeks to blend
the approaches found in national systems in an intricate way. On the one hand a
general, abstract rule is taken as a starting point (Art. VII. – 1:101, cited above); on
the other hand, the content and practical application of this rule is given further
substance through a list of ‘circumstances in which an enrichment is unjustified’
(Art. VII. – 2:101). A general right to claim reimbursement for unjustified enrich-
ment, thus, is combined with a list of specific instances in which enrichment is
deemed unjust, reminiscent of the ‘unjust factors’ approach found in English law.20
The factors adopted are much more abstract, however, and it is not altogether clear
how these rules would affect the outcome of individual cases.
In the hypothetical discussed here, City Construction’s claim seems to fulfil at least
three criteria: there is an enrichment in the form of an ‘increase in assets’ on Sven’s
part (Art. VII. – 3:101 (1) sub a DCFR), to the detriment of City Construction, and
with a sufficient connection between them. More problematic is the requirement that
the enrichment was ‘unjust’. Prima facie, a case may be made for the enrichment to
have been unjustified, as none of the factors listed in Art. VII. – 2:101 applies to sug-
gest differently. However, an important caveat must be made: the DCFR explicitly
excludes from its application issues relating to ownership of immovable property
(see Art. I. – 1:101 (2) (f)). As seen above, such rules were decisive in solving the case
under Dutch and under German law. With the DCFR not giving further guidance, the
outcome of the case will therefore remain dependent on the application of rules of
national law.
II. Descriptive Formants
An explanation for the diversity of national approaches to unjustified enrichment may
be the residual nature of this particular area of the law, i.e. the fact that it is often
invoked only in instances where the core parts of the law of obligations (contract and
tort) do not provide a satisfactory solution.21 With its function to fill gaps in national
laws, and gaps in different legal systems naturally occurring in different instances, the
divergence of national rules is but a logical consequence. Important to realise, how-
ever, is that the underlying principle steering the law of obligations, including the
rules on unjustified enrichment, is a common principle shared by all of the legal sys-
tems under consideration. It is the principle that no one should be enriched at an-
other’s expense, already present in Roman law.22 This common principle may, where
appropriate, form the basis for further development of the law of unjustified enrich-
ment in Europe.
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with the general ‘lack of causa’ principle that underlies Dutch and German law on unjus-
tified enrichment.
20 Compare Smits, o.c., (2008) Stellenbosch Law Review 184.
21 Smits, o.c., (2008) Stell LR 182-3; J. Gordley, Foundations of Private Law (Oxford, OUP,
2006) 417.
22 Pomponius, Digest 50, 17, 206.
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In light of the divergence between existing regimes, as well as the reservations
made with regard to the abstract nature of the DCFR’s provisions on unjustified en-
richment,23 common sense suggests that it may yet be too early for an attempt at
harmonisation of this area of European private law, letting alone whether there is in
fact a need for it. The question regarding the basis of the doctrine of unjustified en-
richment and the proper approach to be adopted – e.g. one resting on the sine causa
requirement or one that takes ‘unjust factors’ as its lead-is of great importance, never-
theless. It is not only fundamental to potential future attempts at harmonisation of
national laws, but also to the internal development of the doctrine in national sys-
tems. In this respect, we would say, the greatest challenges are yet to be found. In
addition to this, two further remarks may be made.
First, the prime arena for the debate is currently in English law, where a struggle
between different approaches can be observed in judicial opinion and in legal scholar-
ship. Peter Birks, shortly before his death in 2004, famously reconsidered his stance on
the matter, advocating the civilian sine causa approach.24 In his opinion, the so-called
swaps cases25– in which a restitutionary award followed from the courts’ decision that
the swap contracts under consideration were void-had pushed the law of unjustified
enrichment in a new direction to which the civilian model fitted much better than the
traditional ‘unjust factors’ approach. This suggestion, however, has so far not been
taken up in the case law, with the House of Lords most recently affirming the ‘unjust
factors’ approach in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell.26 Arguably, apart from practical con-
siderations relating to the facts of the case,27 it is not ‘the right time’ for English law to
make such a drastic departure from established doctrine.28 Seeing that a different start-
ing point in an enquiry on unjustified enrichment may make a substantial difference to
the outcome of a case, it is perhaps wise to have a period of reappraisal of the existing
approach before making radical decisions. The comparative law debate in light of the
DCFR may in this respect provide inspiration.
Secondly, a point on the classification of unjustified enrichment claims. In Dutch
law, which otherwise relies on a general basis for unjustified enrichment, a separate
part of the Civil Code contains specific rules on undue payment (the condictio indebi-
ti).29 The DCFR does not make such a distinction but opts for a general regime for all
types of claims. It may be, and is in any case a point for consideration, that there is no
longer a need to deal with undue payment separately. The separate treatment in the
Code appears to be a historical accident rather than a conscious decision: from Roman
times onwards, this was the type of restitutionary claim laid down in codifications,
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23 See above.
24 Birks, o.c.
25 Hazell v. Hammersmith & Fulham LBC [1992] 2 AC 1, which was followed by a string of
cases, including also Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349.
26 See above. For commentaries, see Tariq A Baloch, The Unjust Enrichment Pyramid (2007)
123 LQR 636; Birke Häcker, Still at the Crossroads (2007) 123 LQR 177.
27 Häcker, o.c., 182.
28 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Lord Walker at [155].
29 Artt. 6:203-211 BW.
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with other actions developing only later in the case law.30 On the other hand, there is a
good argument in favour of holding on to a separate treatment of undue payment: this
claim is the paradigm case of unjustified enrichment. In any legal system, one knows
how to deal with it whereas the boundaries of other restitutionary claims are much less
clear (see below, sub B).
A related question is how the basic rule, such as the one proposed in the DCFR,
relates to restitutionary provisions found in other areas of law, e.g. the ones that occur
with termination of contract (on which see Art. III. – 3:511 ff. DCFR). They are prob-
ably best regarded as a lex specialis to the general provision and as such the primary
source to revert to in the instances that they cover.
III. Meta-legal Formants
The use that will be made of the provisions of Book VII is highly influenced by the
function of the DCFR. The DCFR is not a fully-fledged legal system as we are familiar
with at the national level. Instead, it serves several other purposes.31 First, the Euro-
pean Commission can use it as a building block when revising the present acquis or
when drafting new rules. Secondly, it can be used as an academic text for legal science
and teaching. Thirdly, the DCFR can be a source of inspiration for the national courts,
the European Court of Justice and for national legislators. All these functions imply it
is a ‘tool box’: it is a non-binding instrument32 that, where appropriate,33 can be used
by others. Whether this will in fact be the case, depends on the persuasive authority of
its provisions: without legislators and courts actually using the DCFR, it will remain
dead letter. It should be questioned whether the present structure and provisions of
Book VII can optimally fulfil this function. We will come back on this in part B (Cri-
tical evaluation).
Case 2
Mistaken payment
Insurance company Global Life pays money to Mrs. Colonster, widow of Mr. Colonster, upon her de-
ceased husband’s life insurance policy. Shortly after the payment, it turns out that the policy had lapsed
and the insurance company had not been obliged to pay. Global Life claims back the money on basis of
unjustified enrichment. Is the company entitled to recover on that basis?
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30 Compare Ulpian, Digest 12, 6, 1.
31 Draft Common Frame of Reference, o.c., 6 ff. See in more detail J.M. Smits, The Draft
Common Frame of Reference, Methodological Nationalism and the Way Forward (2008) 4 ERCL
270 ff.
32 Communication on European Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: the Way
Forward, COM (2004) 651 final, OJ EC 2005, C 14/6, 6.
33 Communication 2004, o.c., 3.
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I. Operative Formants
Mistaken payment can be described as the paradigm case of the law of unjust enrich-
ment. In any jurisdiction, one finds rules on how to deal with it, regardless the extent
to which other restitutionary claims or even a general claim for unjust enrichment are
recognised in that jurisdiction.
Before trying to decide the hypothetical on basis of the DCFR, it seems useful to
discuss how the case would be solved in some of the existing European jurisdictions. As
we have already shown in our discussion of hypothetical I, civil law jurisdictions ty-
pically recognise a separate action for undue payment (condictio indebiti). Thus, in
France, the paiement de l’indu (arts. 1235 and 1376 ff. Code Civil) and in Italy the
pagamento dell’indebito (art. 2033 ff. Codice Civile) are the most common restitution-
ary claims. The same is true in the Netherlands, where art. 6:203 (1) Burgerlijk Wet-
boek provides the clear rule that ‘anyone who has given a thing to another without
legal ground is entitled to reclaim it from the recipient as a performance which was not
due.’ Hypothetical 2 would easily fit the conditions of these provisions. Thus, in Dutch
law one would reason that the insurance company can claim back the money if there is
no good ground for the payment. This is rather obvious in this case: it is not likely that
the payment was intended as a gift. Any other reason for paying than the company’s
mistaken belief it had to pay on basis of the life insurance does not exist.
In German law, the mistaken payment is a typical case of the Leistungskondiktion
(‘performance condiction’), a case where the claim is brought to recover the perform-
ance from the other party. This Leistungskondiktion is laid down in § 812 s. 1 BGB: ‘A
person who obtains something by performance by another person (…) without legal
cause is bound to give up to him.’ In the hypothetical, the legal ground for perform-
ance does not exist and Global Life is entitled to recover the payment. This would
only be different if the insurance company knew it was not bound to perform, but still
did so (§ 814 BGB).34
An interesting question is whether the impoverished person had to be in error
about the fact that performance was due. In the hypothetical, Global Life was clearly
in error, but if this would have been less clear, civil law jurisdictions differ as to the
outcome. In German and Dutch law, this is of no importance: the benefit can always
be reclaimed unless the impoverished party actually knew it did not have to perform
(cf. § 814 BGB). The Austrian ABGB (§ 1431) on the other hand explicitly holds that
a mistake of the plaintiff when transferring the money is needed. In France, this is a
disputed question.35
In English law, the case of mistaken payment has always received its own treat-
ment, separate from other types of unjustified enrichment.36 The action for money had
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34 See on German law e.g. J. Beatson and E. Schrage (eds.), Casebooks on the Common Law of
Europe: Unjustified Enrichment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 42 ff. and M.J.
Schermaier, ‘Performance-Based’ and ‘Non-Performance Based’ Enrichment Claims: The Ger-
man Pattern ERPL (2006) 363 ff.
35 See K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn (Oxford, Clar-
endon Press, 1998) 547.
36 See Beatson and Schrage, o.c., 255 ff. for more details.
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and received lies for the recovery of money paid by mistake. In common law, the re-
striction has long been that one could not recover money paid under a mistake of law:
if the defendant believed he was entitled to the money and the plaintiff thought he
had to pay because of his wrong perception of the law, no claim was possible. This has
changed with the decision of the House of Lords in Kleinwort Benson:37 mistake of law
is now also a ground for restitution. The hypothetical would count as a case of mistake
in fact and there is little doubt that Global Life can recover the paid sum. The hypo-
thetical even finds its origin in English law.38 The prevailing English approach of
identifying an unjust factor39 does imply, however, that Global Life needs to show
there is a specific unjust factor such as mistake.40
This overview of how national jurisdictions deal with hypothetical 2 reveals that
the case is not only a common one, but also the archetype of a successful restitutionary
claim: any existing legal system knows how to decide it. This leads us to the question
how the DCFR will deal with the case of mistaken payment.
In the system of the DCFR, no distinction is made between undue payment and
other types of unjustified enrichment. All requirements of the basic rule of art.
VII. – 1:101 (1) DCFR41 have to be met before a claim can be successfully brought:
apart from the enrichment of the defendant, this enrichment should be unjustified,
the claimant should suffer a disadvantage and there should be a sufficient connection
between the enrichment and the disadvantage (so-called ‘attribution’). Only in that
case, the disadvantaged person is to reverse the enrichment. The DCFR follows the
German approach in holding that mistake is no requirement for a successful action (cf.
art. VII. – 2:101 (1) sub b).
In the case of undue payment, the requirement of enrichment is easily met. Art.
VII. – 3:101 (1) makes clear that any increase in assets counts as an enrichment. This is
a very broad definition; if applied to the hypothetical, the enrichment simply lies in
the fact that Colonster received payment from Global Life. The requirement of dis-
advantage (art. VII. – 3:102 (1)) is the corollary of this: in case of undue payment, the
disadvantage is with Global Life that did not have to perform vis-à-vis the other party.
Also the requirement of attribution is laid down in the DCFR: art. VII. – 4:101 men-
tions several instances where there is a sufficient connection between enrichment and
disadvantage. In the case of two parties – as in the case under review here – this
requirement will again be met quite easily: Colonster is enriched by the transfer of
an asset by Global Life (the case mentioned sub a in art. VII. – 4:101).
Given that three of the four requirements for unjustified enrichment are easily met
in hypothetical 2, the true evaluation of whether an action should be available has to
take place in the context of the fourth requirement: the enrichment should be unjus-
tified. Art. VII. – 2:101 reads:
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‘(1) An enrichment is unjustified unless:
(a) the enriched person is entitled as against the disadvantaged person to the
enrichment by virtue of a contract or other juridical act, a court order or a
rule of law; or
(b) the disadvantaged person consented freely and without error to the dis-
advantage.
(2) If the contract or other juridical act, court order or rule of law referred to in
paragraph (1) (a) is void or avoided or otherwise rendered ineffective retro-
spectively, the enriched person is not entitled to the enrichment on that basis.
(3) However, the enriched person is to be regarded as entitled to an enrichment by
virtue of a rule of law only if the policy of that rule is that the enriched person
is to retain the value of the enrichment.
(4) An enrichment is also unjustified if:
(a) the disadvantaged person conferred it:
(i) for a purpose which is not achieved; or
(ii) with an expectation which is not realised;
(b) the enriched person knew of, or could reasonably be expected to know of,
the purpose or expectation; and
(c) the enriched person accepted or could reasonably be assumed to have
accepted that the enrichment must be reversed in such circumstances.’
This provision makes very hard reading for anyone without a solid knowledge of the
restitution law of several European jurisdictions. As discussed in the context of hypo-
thetical 1, when it comes to the requirement of ‘unjustified’, the European restitution-
ary landscape is divided in two. On the one hand, we find most continental jurisdic-
tions that ask whether there is a good reason for a party retaining the enrichment it
received. On the other hand, there is English law, that is not interested in finding a
good reason for a party to keep the benefit, but looks instead for a reason why the
enrichment is unjustified. This unjust factors approach (made famous by Peter Birks42)
requires the claimant to give a specific reason for this unjustness of the enrichment
(such as mistake in the hypothetical).43
Art. VII. – 2:101 DCFR seems to follow the English approach: it mentions factors
that make the enrichment unjustified. Still, the drafting technique is more complica-
ted. The provision mentions factors that make the enrichment justified (s. 1: ‘unjus-
tified unless’) as well as factors that make the enrichment unjustified (s. 4). The list of
factors is of a highly abstract character, which makes it difficult to establish where the
common case of mistaken payment fits in. Apparently, the way of reasoning should be
to investigate first whether undue payment is a case listed in section 1 sub a or b. Now
that this is not the case, the enrichment through the payment can be qualified as
unjustified. But it is not impossible that the situation could also fall under section 4:
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it is clear that if one receives a payment without a valid ground (as Colonster did in
this case), she can assume to have accepted to reverse it. As a consequence, the en-
richment is to be transferred to the disadvantaged person (art. VII. – 5:101).
II. Descriptive Formants
Unlike it is the case with other types of unjustified enrichment (cf. hypothetical 1),
the case of unjust payment has received a similar treatment in most European juris-
dictions. Despite differences in taxonomy,44 the outcome of the case is quite similar
across Europe. If one compares the national solutions with the DCFR, the most striking
thing is that the DCFR has not carved out a separate place for undue payment. Instead,
there is the list of rather abstract factors of art. VII. – 2:101. We find it hard to see what
guidance this list can offer in practice. More important is that the aim of giving a list of
unjust factors seems to be undone when these specific factors are supplemented with a
more open-ended case. Section 4 sub c of art. VII. – 2:101 offers such a more general
category by stating that there is an action for unjustified enrichment if an enrichment
is conferred and the enriched person could reasonably be assumed to have accepted
that the enrichment must be reversed in the circumstances of the case.45 It seems to us
that the extra requirement of this provision that the enrichment is conferred for a
purpose which is not achieved or with an expectation which is not realised (and the
enriched person knows about this) will not offer a real limitation in practice. Inter-
estingly, the chosen formulation comes close to the idea of a ‘quasi-contract’, for long
the basis of an action for unjustified enrichment in English law.46
Clive explains that undue payment is deliberately not mentioned separately in the
DCFR. The draft explicitly rejects the argument that there is no point in complicating
the rules for such a simple case by submerging it to more general rules which have to
cater for unusual cases: ‘this argument is unattractive in the context of a new code. It is
normally better to begin at a general level and proceed to particular cases which may
require special treatment. Moreover, it will be unduly optimistic in assuming that all
cases involving repetition of the undue will be simple cases.’47 In the view of the
drafters, any other view would lead to ‘an awkwardness in the law’ and to difficulties
in separating the two.48
What to think of this ‘unitary’ approach? There is every reason to be critical about
it. If the DCFR were indeed a ‘code’, as Clive suggests, it would make sense to try to
create a coherent system for rules on unjust enrichment (although even then it seems
strange not to accept a separate place for undue payment, a category that any Euro-
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pean lawyer would immediately recognise). In reality, a source of inspiration should
offer model rules that can be easily transposed into existing jurisdictions. The way in
which Book VII is now drafted makes this very difficult: any other solution but to
accept the set of rules as a whole seems not feasible.
III. Meta-legal Formants
See above, at case 1, for some general remarks.
Case 3
Supplying goods or services without a contract
Bruni Ltd. is in need of new office space. Michelle GmbH has several buildings available and after having
inspected some of them, Bruni tells Michelle it intends to rent the building at King’s Bridge 28. Before
any formal contract is concluded, Michelle repairs doors and windows of the building and undertakes
several other works. Bruni, having told Michelle that in order to conclude the formal contract it would
need the approval of its board, makes use of the building for two months. Then, Bruni informs Michelle
it has found other rental space and prefers to go there. Michelle claims compensation for the twomonths
use of the building by Bruni.
I. Operative Formants
Starting work or supplying goods or services in the expectation that a formal contract
will be concluded, is a well-known case in many legal systems.49 The case is an inter-
esting one in view of the different treatment it has received around Europe: both un-
justified enrichment and contract have served as a basis for liability of the party that
benefited from the work of the other. In a typical case, A has done work for B, which
was intended to be remunerated at market rates,50 but for one reason or another there
is no binding contract and B refuses to pay. Such a situation can arise for several
reasons. It could be that the parties did not make a formal contract or were acting
during negotiations. It could also be that the contract was void or the party performing
simply thought a contract would be concluded. Before looking at the DCFR, we will
give some examples of how such a case is decided in national jurisdictions.
Under English law, the problem is known as that of anticipated contracts. The
leading case is British Steel v. Cleveland Bridge and Engineering.51 The plaintiff (British
Steel) negotiated with the defendant (Cleveland Bridge) about the supply of steel
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nodes. During the negotiations, a letter of intent was issued by Cleveland Bridge ask-
ing British Steel to start the work and, while the parties were still negotiating, almost
all the nodes were delivered but not paid for. British Steel then claimed payment, in
the absence of a contract, on basis of the reasonable value of the nodes. Robert Goff, J.
found reason to allow payment, but not on basis of a contract: the parties were still
negotiating and it was impossible to say with any certainty what the terms of the
contract would have been. The proper reason for allowing the claim was that both
parties expected a formal contract to eventuate:52
‘In these circumstances, to expedite performance under that anticipated contract,
one requested the other to commence the contract work, and the other complied with
that request. If thereafter, as anticipated, a contract was entered into, the work done as
requested will be treated as having been performed under that contract; if, contrary to
their expectation, no contract was entered into, then the performance of the work is
not referable to any contract the terms of which can be ascertained, and the law simply
imposes an obligation on the party who made the request to pay a reasonable sum for
such work as has been done pursuant to that request, such an obligation sounding in
quasi contract or, as we say now, in restitution.’
English law would thus base liability on unjustified enrichment.53 Much earlier,
Scots law had already gone the same path.54 The other solution would be to base the
decision in the law of contract. Hypothetical 3 is actually based on a Dutch case,
where contract was indeed found to be the basis for compensating the ‘enriched’ party.
The district court held there was a contract because, in the circumstances of the case,
the performing party could rely on the other party to have agreed to the contract. The
Dutch Supreme Court55 approved of this and found a contract to be available even
though it was very clear to the performing party that there was no approval of the
board on the other side.
These cases illustrate how the principle against unjustified enrichment can be ac-
commodated as a restitutionary claim in one jurisdiction and as a contractual claim in
another.
How would the DCFR deal with the case of supplying goods or services without a
contract? It seems to us that this is precisely the type of case dealt with in section 4 of
art. VII. – 2:101. According to this provision, the enrichment is unjustified if three
requirements are met. First (sub a), the disadvantaged person (Michelle) needs to have
conferred the enrichment for a purpose which is not achieved or with an expectation
which is not realised. We assume that Michelle did anticipate that Bruni would rent
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the premises and is thus disappointed in its expectations. Second (sub b), the enriched
person (Bruni) knew or should have known of this expectation of Michelle. Third (sub
c), the enriched person (Bruni) accepted or could reasonable be assumed to have
accepted that the enrichment must be reversed in the circumstances of the case. This
is where the main balancing issue lies: can Bruni indeed have been expected to accept
the reversal of the enrichment? The factors relevant for this decision are not indicated
in the provision (or elsewhere in the DCFR). We will show below (in part II) that
several elements play a role in answering this question.
II. Descriptive Formants56
If goods are supplied or services are performed, there is often an irreversible situation:
one party received a benefit that can no longer be ‘undone’ and the only way to do
justice is then to allow compensation to the other party. As we saw sub I, both the
principle against unjust enrichment and the argument that parties had actually inten-
ded to provide compensation (a more contract-like way of reasoning) can be used to
reason in favour of compensation.We believe it is insightful that each court in the two
similar cases found a different basis for allowing the claim. Each of these courts thus
emphasised an important aspect of this type of cases. The English court emphasised
the aspect of unjustified enrichment: one party performed at the benefit of another
party who did not do anything in return. The Dutch court put emphasis on the con-
tract it found present in the circumstances of the case: even though there was no real
consent, reasonable parties should have agreed to compensation for the work done in
view of the reliance of one party and the work done on basis of that reliance.
In our view, it is vital to see that in each of these cases – and despite the qualifica-
tions given by the courts – the elements of enrichment, reliance and ‘implied’ con-
sensus can individually not be the foundation for the obligations of parties. On the one
hand, mere reliance (‘contractual expectation reasoning’, as Burrows calls it57) to le-
gitimise the decision is not convincing as reliance as such can never be enough. If
British Steel would only have negotiated, relying on a contract to be concluded, but
would not have supplied the nodes, the court would certainly have denied the action.
Thus, the argument that Cleveland Bridge benefited from the work done by British
Steel, in combination with its reliance, is what stood at the basis of the obligation.
On the other hand, mere enrichment of the party for whose benefit performance took
place is not enough either: it needs to be supplemented with some reliance on being
paid for, usually flowing from the pre-contractual dealings of the parties. If, in hypo-
thetical 3, Michelle would simply have let Bruni make use of the building for two
months, there would have been no need to compensate. The true reason for allowing
a claim in these cases therefore lies in a combination of elements. They are ‘in be-
tween’ cases that cannot be fully explained by contract law – that has for a goal to
protect the, in these cases non-existent, consensus – nor by specific restitutionary
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claims. It is the cumulative impact58 of both reliance and benefit that explains why an
obligation should arise: the party that has received a benefit would be unjustifiably
enriched if a contract would not be found to exist. The principle that unjustified en-
richment should be prevented thus plays a role as a policy factor in reasoning that
there is a contract. What is qualified as a restitution case in one legal system can be a
contract case in another.
III. Meta-legal Formants
See above, at hypothetical 1, for some general remarks.
It is well established around Europe how to deal with the case of supplying goods or
services without a contract. Any national system would be able to find a just outcome,
making use of the factors mentioned in II, above. When drafting European rules, one
would expect these factors to be made explicit: in particular if one drafts rules that
have to derive their authority from the fact that parties, legislators or courts have to
choose these rules, it is essential that they are made as informative (and thereby as
attractive) as possible. One of the ways in which they could be made attractive is by
offering progressive solutions to relatively ‘new’ cases such as the one described in
hypothetical 3. Information about how to solve this type of cases is often difficult to
find in national jurisdictions. At the moment, the DCFR does not contain many of
these progressive alternatives; the common case described here could do with a more
elaborate treatment in the DCFR.
3. Critical Evaluation
In the above, we already made several critical remarks about Book VII of the DCFR. In
this section, we will summarise this criticism by making three different points. First,
the question of taxonomy is discussed. Secondly, it is questioned whether the DCFR
fully grasps the function of the law of unjustified enrichment. Finally, we look into the
function of the DCFR and what this function brings with it for dealing with restitu-
tionary claims.
3.1. The Taxonomy of Book VII Draft CFR
According to the drafters, the model rules contained in the Draft CFR are based on a
comparative analysis of the laws of the member states and of the European Union.59 It
is suggested that in case of diverging solutions, the Draft CFR takes a middle road.60 It
is difficult to assess what this middle road consists of as long as the comments to the
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DCFR, Book VII Case-Based Assessments
provisions are not available. However, on basis of the text of the provisions we can
conclude several things about the system of unjustified enrichment as such.
First, if compared with national systems of enrichment law,61 it is clear that the
Draft CFR does not follow any of the existing national taxonomies. It turns away from
the two-tier structure in civil law jurisdictions of undue payment (condictio indebiti) on
the one hand (cf. arts. 1376-1381 Code Civil, 2033-2040 Codice Civile and 6:203
Dutch BW) and other enrichment claims on the other. The German distinction be-
tween the Leistungskondiktion and the Nichtleistungskondiktion62 is not followed either.
Instead, the DCFR offers an integrated system in which all enrichment claims are
governed by a set of uniform requirements.63 There is one exception: the restitutionary
effects of avoidance and termination of contracts are laid down in the arts.
III. – 3:511 ff. These provisions repeat64 that a party is entitled to claim restitution of
benefits conferred under the contract before avoidance or termination.
We doubt that this ‘new’ taxonomy of the DCFR is an attractive one. According to
one of the drafters, the aim of the rules is ‘to lead the reader gently into the subject,
leaving complex qualifications and refinements until later’.65 When reading the pre-
sent draft, we are not at all certain this will be the impression of the reader. One reason
for this was already explained above (see hypothetical 2): as far as we know, any Euro-
pean legal system has a separate place for undue payment. Not to mention undue
payment as a separate category in a text that should derive its authority from others
using it seems unwise.
Secondly, we must criticise the very broad playing field for unjust enrichment: in
the DCFR, any increase in assets or decrease in liabilities counts as enrichment (art.
VII. – 3:101). This means that enrichment is not a normative concept: any change in
someone’s financial position as a result of the act of another can count as an enrich-
ment. A contracting party that was delivered a good is seen as an enriched party (as is
the party that received the price). Even the house-owner who is confronted with graf-
fiti painted on her walls is enriched in the terminology of the DCFR.66 Although we do
see that a legal text should to some extent contain technical rules, this use of the term
enrichment seems far apart from what even most lawyers would consider as enrich-
ment.
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Thirdly, the DCFR adopts the approach of identifying factors that make the en-
richment either justified or unjustified (art. VII. – 2:101). Apart from the complicated
drafting technique and the abstract character of these factors, we question whether
this is the best way of structuring this area of the law. The unjust factors approach is
heavily criticised in English law; in 2003, Peter Birks explicitly adopted the continen-
tal approach of only allowing a claim in case of enrichment without a legal basis.67 The
continental approach has the advantage that it adopts the uniform criterion of wheth-
er there is a legal ground for the defendant to retain the benefit. The unjust factors
approach lacks this unified structure: the factors are very different.68 We agree with
Zimmermann’s remark that ‘it is hardly conceivable that a legal system engaged with
the task of rationally reorganizing its law of unjustified enrichment should take its lead
from English jurisprudence.’69 The continental approach, moreover, appears to have
the support of the European Court of Justice, as evidenced by its recent case law.70
According to the Court: ‘legal redress for undue enrichment, as provided for in the
majority of national legal systems, is not necessarily conditional upon unlawfulness or
fault with regard to the defendant’s conduct’; on the other hand, ‘in order for an action
for unjust enrichment to be upheld, it is essential that there be no valid legal basis for
the enrichment’.71 It makes sense, not least from a viewpoint of applicability (see point
3 below), to reconsider the provisions of the DCFR with this in mind.
3.2. The Function of Unjustified Enrichment Law
The drafters consider the DCFR as a coherent system in itself: they have tried to create
a legal system that is as consistent as a national jurisdiction. Within that system, the
place for unjust enrichment is clearly defined. The question is whether this is com-
pletely in line with the role that the law of unjust enrichment often plays.72
We believe that restitution law differs in one important aspect from other parts of
the law of obligations.While contract law and tort law are more or less coherent sets of
rules, the law of unjust enrichment is much less coherent. As Gordley puts it: the law
of restitution does not rest on a coherent principle, but on ‘the need in disparate cases
to fill the gaps left by other branches of the law.’73 The traces of this residual character
of restitution law can be found in all major jurisdictions. In Germany, the typology of
two types of enrichment claims is for example not seen as exhaustive: there are other
cases in which restitutionary claims should be allowed and it is difficult to structure
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these other cases in a consistent way. English law struggled for a long time with finding
a proper place for the various enrichment claims. And in many jurisdictions there is an
enduring struggle about the extent to which the enrichment action is a subsidiary one
vis-à-vis contractual claims and claims in tort.74 These are in our view signs of the
unclear place of unjustified enrichment in private law as a whole. It fills the gaps left
open by other branches of the law.75
If an important function of enrichment law is to correct and to supplement the
other sources of obligations, will it then be possible to harmonise this area of the law?
This is dependent on what we mean by harmonisation. If harmonisation means that
existing national legal systems are replaced by a binding European code, it is certainly
possible to carve out a proper place for enrichment law. In a well worked out system of
obligations, the supplementing role of the enrichment claim can be properly defined –
as it is now reasonable well defined in most national jurisdictions. But such full har-
monisation is not the aim of the Draft CFR. As we saw before, the Draft CFR will
primarily be used as a toolbox for new European legislation, as source of inspiration for
national courts and legislators or as an optional code. In all these varieties, the so-
called multi-layered structure of European private law will be reinforced: present efforts
towards the harmonisation of private law do not lead to an elimination of national
jurisdictions, but to a continuous living together of European and national rules. This
prompts the need to think about which rules serve a certain purpose better at the
European or at the national level. If large parts of enrichment law serve the function
of correcting and supplementing the existing law of obligations, this function is in our
view best fulfilled at the national level.76 The way in which the principle against un-
justified enrichment is applied is so dependent on the internal structure of a national
legal system (the way in which the sources of obligations communicate with each
other) that it is almost impossible to have one ideal set of European principles. Ste-
phen Swann employs the wording of ‘constructing a castle in the air’ as long as there
are no common foundations underlying the European law of obligations.77
Does this mean one should not incorporate rules on unjustified enrichment in the
CFR? This would go too far. There certainly is a need to deal with the restitutionary
effects of avoidance and termination of contracts (now laid down in the arts III. –
3:511 ff.). But outside of this area, the CFR should not offer a fully-fledged self-con-
tained and self-referential78 legal system on restitution as we know in national legal
systems. In view of the function of the CFR as a toolbox for European and national
legislators and courts, it should be enough to state the principle against unjustified
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enrichment. Interested parties can then use this principle as an argument whenever
necessary. This means it is too early to draft detailed rules.
3.3. The Function of the DCFR
Finally, we repeat that the success of the DCFR is completely dependent on its use:
without the European and national legislator and courts using it as a source of inspira-
tion or contracting parties using it as an optional instrument, it will remain dead
letter.79 It is the persuasive authority of its provisions that provides the DCFR with
authority.
We question whether the present structure and provisions of Book VII can opti-
mally fulfil this function. As it is not likely that this part of the DCFR can function as
an optional instrument freely chosen by the parties themselves, the drafters should
have focused on offering an attractive set of rules that can be of use for legislators and
courts. We have shown in the above that the present set of rules is not the best one to
conceive of. A successful source of inspiration should offer model rules that can be
easily transposed into existing jurisdictions. The way in which Book VII is now drafted
makes this very difficult: any other solution but to accept the set of rules as a whole
seems not feasible.
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